The Macalester Review
Volume 3 | Issue 1

Article 3

3-7-2013

A Field Study of Consociationalism in the
Northern Ireland Assembly: A Moderating
Influence or Threat to Democracy?
Ellen Noble
Macalester College, enoble@macalester.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macreview
Part of the Political Theory Commons, and the Politics and Social Change Commons
Recommended Citation
Noble, Ellen (2013) "A Field Study of Consociationalism in the Northern Ireland Assembly: A Moderating Influence or Threat to
Democracy?," The Macalester Review: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macreview/vol3/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the DigitalCommons@Macalester College at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Macalester Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information,
please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.

Noble: A Field Study of Consociationalism in the Northern Ireland Assembly

A Field Study of Consociationalism in the Northern Ireland
Assembly: A Moderating Influence or Threat to Democracy?
Ellen Louise Noble
Project Advisor: Michael Anderson, M.A. Politics, University of College Dublin.

Abstract:
This paper is the outcome of a month-long exploratory study on whether consociationalism has a
moderating influence on politics in Northern Ireland. I analyzed the impact of consociationalism
on policymaking, party platforms and voter choice to determine if it strengthens and enlarges the
middle ground or bifurcates the political community into two extreme and conflicting political
agendas. Data was obtained through a literature study and eight interviews with academics as
well as political representatives and advisors. This research tested two competing theories of
consociationalism: David Horowitz’s theory of consociationalism as a centrifugal force and John
McGarry’s and Brendand O’Leary’s theory that consociationalism encourages cooperation and
unifying politics. It is concluded that consociationalism has had a dramatic moderating influence
on policies and political platforms, but voter choice is still controlled by ethnic allegiances. The
disconnect between voter choice and actual governance within Stormont allows parties to
grandstand on loose, undefined and shifting platforms which stifles the democratic process. This
paper recommends a shift in electoral systems or minor changes to the current consociational
structure.
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Introduction
Prior to my research, I spent two and half months in Ireland studying the history and
politics of the island. I heard the stories of former prisoners and members of paramilitary
organizations, of the sympathizers and the apathetic, and of victims whose worlds were
destroyed as they lost friends and family in the conflict. I found many stories disturbing; some
men proudly described a victory against the enemy, involving the clever placement of a bomb or
the gunning down of men loading their weapons. At other times, I felt the remaining tension of
the conflict in the uncomfortable awkward silence after a student’s presumptive question or
unknowingly insensitive remark. I felt the lasting pain in the voice of a victim as she explained
that the man who killed her father walks freely in the halls of Stormont, the parliament building
of her own government. If the stories were not enough, the schools and harsh cement walls that
divide catholic and protestant communities should be sufficient evidence that Northern Ireland,
despite the lack of physical violence, is still a place of extreme political, ethnic and religious
conflict. It is hard to overcome 30 years of bloody conflict and the loss of over 3,000 lives.1
It was difficult to imagine effective political cooperation after witnessing the deep
divisions throughout the community. As a citizen of a country where there is constant gridlock
between two different political ideologies, I was baffled by the prospect of a functional
government that requires the cooperation of parties emerging from years of violent conflict with
one another. Thus, I set out to understand the effect of the power-sharing arrangement on party
politics and the democratic system at large. I decided to investigate the impact of the powersharing system on Northern Ireland, specifically to see whether it encourages more moderate
politics.

1

“On this Day: 1974: 'Troubles' death toll hits 1,000.” BBC.
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In the Belfast Agreement of 1998, political parties from both sides of the ethnic divide
agreed to a devolved system of government composed of the Northern Ireland Assembly and a
joint cross-community power-sharing executive. There was to be mandatory cross-community
voting on major issues and electoral representation in accordance with the D’Hondt method,
which is proportional representation by party-list. 2 This power-sharing structure and electoral
system of proportional representation are key components of consociationalism, a form of
government often recommended for post conflict states. The Belfast Agreement was not
immediately effective due to pressures on the IRA to decommission and the DUP’s antiagreement stance. However, all key stakeholders, including the DUP, reaffirmed the agreement
in the 2007 St. Andrews Agreement.3 The political context was finally ripe for a consociational
system, planting hope for political stability in Northern Ireland. Today, Northern Ireland is at a
new crossroad; with the economic downturn underway, the government is faced with challenges
beyond presenting a cooperative government. They must start making serious policy decisions
that will produce real and effective results. The symbolism of Martin McGinnis and Peter
Robinson standing together made a difference, but now they must prove they can be a functional
government that serves the interests of their people.
This paper investigates whether consociationalism has a moderating influence on politics
in Northern Ireland. I will analyze the impact of consociationalism on policymaking, party
platforms and elections to determine if it strengthens and enlarges the middle ground or
bifurcates the political community into two extreme and conflicting political agendas. First, I
outline the methodology of my research, as well as a review of the interview process and
prominent topic literature. This includes a discussion of resources, challenges and personal bias.
2
3

North Ireland Office, “The Agreement,” 7.
Northern Ireland Assembly, “The Agreement at St. Andrew’s.” Annex A, 2 (2007).
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Then, I set up the academic context and introduce the theoretical frameworks that my main
argument will engage. Subsequently, I outline my argument. Horowitz’s theory of centrifugal
force affects voter choice but not actual policymaking or even party platforms beyond basic
posturing. In fact, consociationalism has had a dramatic moderating influence on politics within
Stormont. The disconnect between voter choice and actual governance within Stormont allows
parties to grandstand on loose, undefined and shifting platforms which stifles the democratic
process. Finally, I briefly discuss possible solutions including the Deborda voting system
advocated by Peter Emerson.

Methodology
To analyze the impact of consociationalism on politics in Northern Ireland, I conducted
eight semi-structured interviews and researched secondary sources. A combination of both
academic literature and interviews of key players enabled me to connect the ivory tower
academic theory to what is actually happening on the ground. It is useful to look at past cases,
group psychology, and theoretical explanations, but only by hearing from the people who work
within the system and confront these issues daily will research be applicable or helpful to policy
decisions.
For interviews, I targeted academics with published work on consociationalism in
Northern Ireland, as well as political representatives and strategists from different political
parties. I strived to hear a diverse range of perspectives. Of the eight people I spoke with, three
were academics with no stated affiliation. Of the remaining five interviews with political
advisors and current and former representatives, three were with unionists, specifically DUP and
UUP representatives as well as the former leader of the PUP. My interview with Sinn Fein was
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the only nationalist representation. In addition, I interviewed an advisor to the green party with
no self-identified ethnic affiliation, but from a protestant background. While I would much prefer
an equal representation of unionist and nationalist parties, my interviews were never intended to
be an accurate survey of party positions. One individual cannot represent an entire party’s
perspective. In fact, the people I spoke with were often chosen for their unique experiences that
would make them poor representatives of the average politician from their party.
I chose not to use a tape recorder because I was speaking with many political
representatives and advisors that could be liable for things they say. The topic area was sensitive
because interviewees were often evaluating or describing other parties and politicians at
Stormont. My highest priority, especially with the politicians, was an honest conversation about
the political dynamics, trends, and relationships between parties. I approached each interview as
an opportunity to uncover new ideas and perspectives from people who are deeply engaged with
the political system or academic debate that I am exploring. The interviews were an opportunity
to challenge the interviewees’ previously stated positions, to dig deeper into the debate and to
hear how individuals experience the consociational system on a day-to-day basis. By the end of
my research period, I had conducted eight interviews, each between 45 minutes and an hour and
a half.
Three interviews were with academics, two with experience writing about
consociationalism in Northern Ireland and one expert on electoral systems in post-conflict states.
First, I met with Dr. Peter McLoughlin who is a lecturer at Queen’s University Belfast and
author of, “Horowitz’s theory of ethnic party competition and the case of the SDLP, 1970-79” in
the journal of Irish Political Studies. The second lecturer from Queen’s University I interviewed
is Dr. John Garry whose research focus is on electoral behavior, public opinion and party
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competition in British and Irish politics. The third academic interviewed was Peter Emerson,
director of the De Borda Institute, a nonprofit organization that aims to “promote the use of
inclusive voting procedures on all contentious questions of social choice”.4
Of the five political professionals, there were two current political representatives, one
former representative, and two political advisors. I first met with Ross Brown, a young political
advisor for the Green Party. Next, was MLA Sammy Douglas from the Democratic Unionist
Party and MLA John McAllister from the Ulster Unionist Party. Douglas is a former community
organizer from East Belfast. While he just entered the Northern Ireland Assembly in May 2011, I
thought he would have a unique perspective considering his experience with economic
regeneration and social justice. John McCallister was elected in 2007 as MLA for the South
Down constituency. He is also the UUP’s deputy party leader and new whip. The interviews with
Douglas, McCallister and Brown all happened in offices in Stormont.
Finally, on my last day in Belfast, I met with former leader of the Progressive Unionist
Party, Dawn Purvis, and Elections Director for Sinn Fein, Gary Flemming. Dawn Purvis left the
PUP due to the party’s relationship with the Ulster Volunteer Force, and then ran as an
Independent Unionist. She lost her seat in the 2011 elections. Gary Flemming is a long time
political advisor for Sinn Fein and most recently their Election Director. All of the people I
spoke with have seriously reflected on the government structure and electoral system throughout
their lives; they all had insightful perspectives.

The Consociationalism Debate: Academic Context and Theory

4
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Before engaging in the debate over consociationalism in Northern Ireland, it is important
to understand the academic context the debate emerges from. Group theorists Arthur Bentley,
Davis Truman and Seymour Martin Lipset argue that the leaders of social groups with
“heterogeneous and over-lapping memberships” will find it necessary to adopt moderate
positions when in competition with one another. In political terms, if voter preference is of
normal distribution on the bell curve, and there are two competing parties, the party that can steal
the most middle ground will have the most votes.5 By contrast, when a society has deep
cleavages and little overlapping membership between groups, there is no pressure to become
more moderate. From Aristotle to John Rawls, political theorists have argued that moderation is
key to political stability in a democratic system.
Academics and policymakers view moderation as a key goal of post-conflict
reconstruction. As groups moderate their allegiances in relation to the ethnic conflict, they will
antagonize their counterparts less and move further from the radical ideologies that threaten the
foundation of the state. The more political moderation, the more space for compromise between
divided communities. Lipset asserts that “the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the
extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant
affiliations.”6 Therefore, literature evaluating post-conflict government structures focuses on
how the system moderates both ethnic allegiances and issue-based agendas.
Arend Lijphart first coined the term consociationalism as he attempted to explain how
countries like Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands managed to maintain stability despite
their divided subcultures. He credited the political elites’ highly cooperative relationships for the

5

John Garry, Personal interview (17 Nov. 2011).
Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, (Garden City, N.Y:
Doubleday, 1960).
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countries’ stability.7 This paper adopts Lijphart’s definition of consociationalism. He describes it
as,
“pragmatically driven elite-level bargaining for a form of executive powersharing in which the autonomy of contending groups is constitutionally
guaranteed and protected through mutual veto rights, and where there is a strong
respect for the principles of proportionality in elections, civil service
appointments and government subsidies.” 8
Several authors, namely Paul Dixon, argue that Lijphart’s loose definition enables him to claim
all successful post-conflict states as prime models of consociationalism and exclude all the
failures. Yet because my paper only attempts to evaluate the consociational government model in
Northern Ireland, I am less concerned with a universally applicable definition for evaluating
consociationalism at large.9
Lijphart is the leading defender of consociationalism and believes it is a key moderating
force among political elites that can create a stable society from the top down. John McGarry and
Brendan O’Leary, critical but loyal consociationalists, believe the power-sharing system forces
cooperation and compromise between divided parties and is “intended to foster tolerance, mutual
recognition, and respect for differences.”10
Donald Horowitz, on the other hand, criticizes the application of concosciationalism in
Northern Ireland. He argues that it does not foster moderate politics, but instead, creates a
centrifugal force moving voters toward more extreme parties. Horowitz believes the mandatory
categorization of political parties as nationalist, unionist or other institutionalizes ethnic divides.
7

Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics: a Quarterly Journal of
International Relations 21.2 (1969): 212.
8

Rupert Taylor, “The Belfast Agreement and the Politics of Consociationalism: a Critique” The
Political Quarterly 77 (2006): 218.
9
Paul Dixon, “Consociationalism and the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” Nationalism and
Ethnic Politics 3.3 (1997): 25-30.
10
John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, “Explaining Northern Ireland,” Political Studies (1996):
135.
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As a result, politics cannot be the vehicle for moderation of ethnic allegiances, social
transformation and eventual integration.11 He also highlights the mutual veto power only
available to ethnically affiliated parties, which disadvantages the multi-ethnic or non-ethnic
parties who take the moderate stance on conflict-based issues.12
At the heart of his criticism, is the belief that consociationalism will not support political
moderation, but rather, destroy it. Normal politics have a centripetal pull towards the moderate
center to pick up floaters. By contrast, in the consociational system there is little chance any
voter crosses the ethnic divide so there is no incentive for parties to move toward the middle
ground. For consociationalism, the competition is within each ethnic community and this creates
a centrifugal force because of intra-ethnic outbidding. Intra-ethnic outbidding is when parties
compete for the role of the more extreme party since any compromises with the other ethnic
group is seen as a weakness that the adversary will take advantage of.13 National-ethnic
communities want a party that will be the strongest defender of their interests and who will not
sell-out to their ethnic opponents. Horowitz sees the continuous public fear of a majoritarian
institution or non-ethnic or multi-ethnic parties as evidence that the conflict is still very much
alive in politics.14 Consociationalism fails to move the state forward towards peace. Instead, it reentrenches divisions and leads moderates, fearful of losing out in negotiations, to more extreme
parties.

11

Taylor, 217-225
Donald L. Horowitz, Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: the Sources of an Unlikely
Constitutional Consensus (Sage, 2002) 195.

12

13

Peter Mcloughlin, “Horowitz's Theory of Ethnic Party Competition and the Case of the
Northern Ireland Social Democratic and Labour Party 1970-79,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics
(2008): 551.
14
Horowitz, 200.
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By contrast, Lijphart is not persuaded by a plea for social transformation. He is less
concerned how the public feels about one another and more interested in seeing political elites
work together to maintain power and a stable state. In fact, Lijphart thinks a kind of voluntary
apartheid system may be the best option for a divided society. He argues that clear boundaries
dividing subcultures, both physical and metaphorical, make it easier for the groups to co-exist.15
The less contact between groups, the less chance for conflict. Lijphart is not concerned that
consociatinoalism institutionalizes or re-entrenches ethnic divisions because he thinks clear-cut
divisions are actually useful to maintaining peace.
McGarry and O’Leary, however, are more sympathetic to Horowitz’s argument. They
argue any approach that attempts to integrate, empower cross-community political parties or
even remove the peoples’ fixation on ethnic identity is desirable but unrealistic.16 They believe
consociationalism is a transitory government system and is the best option available. Moreover,
consociationalism effectively involves former radical and violent groups in the political structure
giving them a new outlet for their activism. 17 While they agree social transformation leading to a
normalization of politics is ideal, they do not believe it can be achieved any time soon, especially
considering the remaining constitutional question in Northern Ireland.

Consociationalism in Northern Ireland
The first strand of the 2007 St. Andrews Agreement outlines the power-sharing
arrangement. The nominating officer of the largest party from the largest designation nominates
the First Minister and the nominating officer from the largest party in the second largest
15

Lijphart, 219.
McGarry, John and Brendan O’Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational
Engagements (Oxford University Press 2004).
17
McGarry, “Consociational Theory,” 260-61.

16
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designation in the Assembly nominates the Deputy First Minister.18 In practice, this means the
two largest parties within each ethnic community, currently the Democratic Unionist Party and
Sinn Fein, share executive power with a mutual veto policy.
The document states that absent consensus within the Executive on a particular issue, the
vote would be taken on a cross-community basis.19 This element of the agreement is
implemented through the petition of concern, which states that 30 MLAs may move to require a
cross-community vote on a particular motion, which requires a majority vote from both the
unionist and nationalist communities. Petition of concerns are frequently used when legislation is
controversial, related to the ethnic conflict or otherwise significant.20
Northern Ireland uses the De Haunt electoral model, which is a form of proportional
representation designed for a divided society. This system allocates representatives, ministerial
positions of the 12 departments, and even speech time in accordance with the “highest average”,
a party’s total vote divided by a certain figure, which increases as the party wins more seats. In
the first round, the dividing figure is one, but in subsequent rounds it is the total number of seats
gained plus one. The result is a system that largely benefits the biggest parties but leaves room
for smaller parties to gain a few seats. 21
While the definition of consociationalism is not clear-cut, the Northern Ireland
government structure is based on the core principles of a consociational government. While
consociationalism is suppose to be a transitory process, it is unrealistic Northern Ireland changes
its system for a long time because nationalists need a power-sharing arrangement to feel secure.

18

Northern Ireland Assembly, Annex A, 9.
Northern Ireland Assembly, Annex A, 2.
20
Rick Wilford and Robin Wilson, A Democratic Design: The Political Style of the Northern
Ireland Assembly (London: Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, UCL, 2001) 49.
21
“D’Hondt system for picking NI ministers in Stormont,” BBC, 11 May 2011.
19
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As a result, consociationalism needs to be able to withstand time and its long-term impact on
politics is important. An analysis of the shift in policymaking, party platforms and electoral
trends will illustrate whether this form of government acts as a moderating force. My goal is to
compare the theoretical debate to the voices on the ground.
Horowitz’s theory is that consociationalism encourages ethnic outbidding. He argues that
within each ethnic community, parties compete to be the stronger party that will fight the hardest
for their own people in negotiations. He believes this is dangerous because it creates a race
between parties to become more extreme and cooperate less with the other side since that may be
seen as a sign of weakness.22 The problem, of course, is that a system that creates an incentive
for parties to become more extreme and antagonistic is not healthy for a post-conflict state. On
the other hand, McGarry and O’Leary believe that the system forces cooperation and the
formation of compromises and moderate politics. I will examine whether consociationalism is a
centrifugal force, as Horowitz suggests, or if it is a moderating influence as argued by McGarry
and O’Leary. I will explore these conflicting theories by analyzing consociationalism’s affect on
policymaking, party platforms and voter choice.

Policies and Platforms: Contesting Horowitz’s Theory
I contend Horowitz’s fear of consociationalism creating extremist, divided and
antagonistic policies and political agendas within Stormont is misplaced. There is no outlet in
Stormont for parties to engage in ethnic outbidding in terms of policymaking. Horowitz’s
centrifugal force only applies to matters related to the ethnic conflict because those are the issues
that trigger fear in people and create a defensive posture where voters need the strongest, most

22

Mcloughlin, “Horowitz’s Theory,” 551-552.
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extreme party to protect them in negotiations. However, matters related to the conflict or
otherwise controversial are rarely on the table. Green Party advisor Ross Brown explained that,
due to the petition of concern, basically a mutual veto, any vote that threatens the power of either
ethnic group would be immediately shut down.23 In fact, it is not even worth the effort pursuing
policies to posture for hardliners because there is no chance such policies would make it through
the system.
Lets put this argument in perspective. Imagine the DUP wanted to take votes from the
UUP by engaging in ethnic outbidding. They might consider pushing a policy for stricter
policing since their constituents have viewed the police as their protector in the past. However, if
the DUP tried to posture itself as fighting for the protestant’s issues, Sinn Fein would look weak.
As a result, Sinn Fein would immediately enact the petition of concern to block DUP’s new
policing policy. There is no room for parties to pursue antagonistic policies and thus, fortunately,
consociationalism does not encourage extremism in policymaking.24
As for party platforms, ethnic outbidding exists only in terms of posturing. Because
politicians cannot pass policies that benefit their ethnic group relative to the other, their
platforms have to address issues that are actually feasible to implement. MLA for the UUP, John
McCallister, explained that debates about the police service or other conflict related issues are a
throwback to the past. These days, politicians are under pressure to talk about the bread and
butter issues. He also said that politics use to be very inward looking, but now politicians are

23

Ross Brown, Personal interview (4 Nov. 2011).
Gerry Moriraty, “North hopes 'vision thing' may bring a bounce,” The Irish Times 19 Nov
2011.

24
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focusing on issues that will affect the public. Politics is moving past the original focus of just
keeping Stormont afloat.25
While platforms are substantively less divisive, parties still posture when presenting their
agendas. For example, when I spoke with the Election Director of Sinn Fein, Gary Flemming, he
continued to reinforce that the party plans to reunite the north with the Republic of Ireland. He
mentioned integrating government structures even though he must know that such an effort is,
for now, politically impossible.26 Flemming’s posturing, despite the political realities, goes to
show how Horowitz’s theory of the centrifugal force exists only on the surface, on a perceptual
level. It does not have a significant impact on parties’ political agendas. Parties may occasionally
grandstand on divisive issues to remind voters whose side they are on, but they will not be
pressured to make their platforms more extreme because there is no threat of an opposition that
can “out bid” them.
There cannot be a more extreme alternative party within either ethnic community because
such an antagonistic party would not be able to function in Stormont. To be a more extreme or
stubborn party without rejecting the agreement would result in complete gridlock, but at this
point in the process, constituents want a functional government more than a party that never
compromises. As DUP MLA Sammy Douglas explained, the majority of people want the system
to work”.27 They want to see a party negotiate well for their interests, which means the party has
to come back to show its constituents some benefit it effectively negotiated for. The public is not
in favor of a pre-agreement world so parties that try to outflank Sinn Fein or the DUP will find it
difficult to gain traction. Thus, despite occasional posturing, party platforms also have to become

25

John McCallister, Personal interview (15 Nov. 2011).
Gary Flemming, Personal interview (18 Nov. 2011).
27
Sammy Douglas, Personal interview (15 Nov. 2011).
26
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moderate and advocate policies that are politically realistic. Horowitz’s theory of a centrifugal
force pushing parties to the edges of the political spectrum does not accurately describe the
policymaking and political agendas developing in Northern Ireland.
Despite the inapplicability of Horowitz’s theory on current policymaking and platform
setting, I agree with Peter McLoughlin that Horowitz’s theory did have a greater impact on
politics in the years following the Belfast Agreement. He explains that it was impossible for the
SDLP to compromise after the bloody events of the early 1970s. In reaction, the SDLP fell back
on its Catholic nationalist base. Because the birth of the SDLP and their efforts to compromise
coincided with the Troubles, they were forced to abandon their compromising and peacemaking
position in order to stay afloat in the political arena.28 In addition, “in 1977 the Irish
Independence Party, though weak, challenged the SDLP causing them to ‘go more green’ which
led to the departure of two founding fathers, Devlin and Fitt.29 The incentive to be the stronger
party in terms of defending your ethnic group’s interests played a much larger role during the
emergence of the consociational system.
This discrepancy can be explained by the unique political context. At that time, people
did not fully believe a functional government was more important than how sectarian issues were
resolved. Therefore, there was space for groups to steal the hardliners’ support by opposing the
agreement. Yet, since then, Sinn Fein and the DUP have effectively moved inwards towards the
middle while maintaining in step with their base. Over time, they have constantly pushed
inwards but are always careful not to become too moderate, too fast and risk losing their
hardliner base.

28
29

Mcloughlin, “Horowitz’s Theory,” 564-565.
Mcloughlin, “Horowitz’s Theory,” 569.
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Policies and Platforms: Moderation Through Intra-Group Competition
The moderating influence of consociationalism on policies and political agendas is
significant. This movement towards the middle ground is caused by intra-group competition. To
gain more votes within their ethnic communities, parties must move towards the middle.30
Academic from Queen’s University, Peter McLoughlin, explains that Sinn Fein has become
increasingly moderate and adopted the SDLP’s original platform, thus effectively co-opting
many of their supporters. He sees a parallel trend in the unionist community. The DUP, a party
that originally refused to sit in the same room as Sinn Fein, is now very cooperative in
committees and at the ministerial level. In a sense, they too, have taken the UUP’s original peace
making status.31
In addition, Sinn Fein, known for its leftist politics, is increasingly conservative, while
the conservative DUP is increasingly liberal. Both parties are moving towards the center. Brown
stated that Sinn Fein’s economic policies are increasingly more conservative.32 Brown also
mentioned the SDLP, originally leftwing, was moving towards the right and pointed to the
growth of conservative Catholics in the party.33 Douglas agreed with Brown’s take on Sinn Fein
economic policies. Douglas thinks Sinn Fein is becoming more conservative while the DUP
becomes more liberal. He explained that the DUP was less church oriented and moving towards
the center. He went on to say, “Peter Robinson and I want to go back to the DUP’s roots with the
lower class”.34 Later that day, McCallister told me his party, the UUP, was the real centrist party.
As support, he referenced David Cameron legislating for gay marriage in Britain. I inferred the

30

Garry.
Peter McLoughlin, Personal interview (8 Nov. 2011).
32
Brown.
33
Id.
34
Douglas.
31
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UUP support David Cameron because of the context of McCallister’s reference to him when
describing the UUP’s increasingly moderate political stance. McCallister also agreed that the
DUP was becoming increasingly moderate on the political spectrum. He said the DUP was
moving inward and claiming the UUP platform. Young people are not embarrassed to vote for
them anymore and Peter Robinson is moving towards the center ground. McCallister continued
to explain it was “getting crowded in the center” and that there’s been moderation both in terms
of sectarianism and left verse right wing politics.35 All parties are competing within their ethnic
block to be moderate and collect the most votes. Consociationalism creates intra-block
competition, which can have a moderating effect.
In conclusion, I found that there was no meaningful centrifugal force in terms of
policymaking and party platforms. Instead, there is a significant shift towards more moderate
politics. While it is encouraging to see more moderate policies and compromising among
political leadership, it is also important voters’ political views are increasingly moderate and less
antagonistic.

Voter Choice: The Prisoner’s Dilemma of Consociationalism
Consociationalism has less of a moderating influence on voter choice. Voter choice is not
necessarily controlled by policy making and platforms. People can vote for a candidate based on
characteristics that do not affect their actual polity. For example, they could vote based off the
candidate’s appearance, personal character, family background, or in this case, ethnicity and
religion. Moreover, you can vote for a candidate as a symbolic gesture to support the causes they
stand for, even if you know they cannot realistically legislate on behalf of those causes. Through

35
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my discussions with political representatives, it seems that voter choice can still be explained by
Horowitz’s theory that consociationalism acts as a centrifugal force.
Voters choose which party to vote for based on who they think will best protect their
interests in negotiations. They tend to make this decision based on which party is perceptually
more aggressive and stronger in defending the interests of their ethnic group. Voters view
politics as a zero-sum game, whether or not it actually is, explained Dawn Purvis, former leader
of the Progressive Unionist Party. She explained that most people want to vote for the
aggressive party and because of the way history played out, those parties are Sinn Fein and the
DUP. Flemming, when explaining the growth of Sinn Fein, said “the negotiating strength of Sinn
Fein actively captured people’s imagination”. 36
Brown explained the phenomenon as a classic prisoner’s dilemma. Ideally, both parties
vote for the cooperative party and then the two most cooperative parties can govern most
effectively. However, if one party votes for the cooperative party and the other votes for the
more extreme one, voters feel the cooperative party would be taken advantage of and their ethnic
group would lose power and be in danger. Therefore, voters tend to vote for the most extreme
party that they think will fight the hardest and not sell out their constituents in negotiations. This
creates an unfortunate scenario where the two most extreme or antagonistic parties are in office
together.37 In the case of Northern Ireland, we know the voters’ decision to put in power the two
most extreme parties does not cause much damage because the system forces them to cooperate.
However, the prisoner’s dilemma is still perceived to be true. Voters still believe they are in
danger unless they vote the extreme party in power. Thus, voter choice is affected by Horowitz’s
theory of ethic outbidding even if it does not affect actual policy.
36
37
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As a result, parties must put on a performance. It is important for parties, mainly Sinn
Fein and the DUP, to be perceived as hardliners, even if they cannot actually act as hardliners
because of the structure of consociationalism. Brown believes Sinn Fein and the DUP are very
conscious of this. He said that when the cameras are on in the chambers the DUP and Sinn Fein
throw around insults and act aggressive. When the cameras are off, however, and they are
working side by side in committees, they tend to get along quite well.38 Hard-line unionist Jim
Allister agreed with this sentiment when he recently said “When you get up close to them at
Stormont it still amazes me how those who once pledged to smash Sinn Féin are today their
buddies.”39 It is in both the interest of Sinn Fein and the DUP to be perceived as antagonistic and
at each other’s throats because it is that kind of posturing that keeps Catholics and Protestants too
scared to vote for a more compromising party.
Of course, to claim all constituents cast their votes just to preserve their ethnic group’s
relative power is an over simplification and inaccurate, but the political leaders and academics I
spoke with did believe the prisoner’s dilemma mentality plays a major role in elections. Thus,
when determining if consociationalism has had a moderating influence on Northern Ireland
politics, the answer is messy. There is a legacy of Horowitz’s model that continues to affect voter
choice, but at the same time the parties are moving inward and adopting more moderate policies
and platforms. Thus, in the words of McLoughlin, “the parties that seem extreme are really quite
moderate”.40

Policies and Platforms: Moderate or Meaningless?

38
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Because voter choice is often determined by the perception of a party’s allegiance to their
ethnic community and not their actual policies, a problem with consociationalism arises. As seen
above, Sinn Fein and the DUP can rely on a large sum of votes just by nature of their reputations
as the defenders of nationalist and unionist interests. This gives them the freedom to become
more moderate, but also to stand on loose, undefined shifting platforms. Each party has a strong
base of loyal hardliners so they dedicate their efforts to attracting the floating voters, those
without strong allegiances who may shift to Sinn Fein from other parties. The hardliner bases are
so loyal that parties are able to become overly inclusive and claim to serve other groups with
radically different interests. The disconnect between voter choice and actual governance within
Stormont allows parties to grandstand on loose, undefined and shifting platforms which stifles
the democratic process.
There is a difference between increasingly moderate agendas and undefined shifting
agendas. Moderate politics does not mean the party chooses to stand for nothing. As parties and
platforms have become more moderate, they may have also become less defined and too broad.
After speaking with political figures, it is unclear what each party stands for outside of
unattainable nationalist and unionist agendas. Parties are voting on normal issues including
budgets, education, corporate tax, etc, but there is not an ideology directing their decisions or a
consistent application of principles.
Political representatives and advisors recognize the fluidity of their political agendas.
Purvis explained how the DUP had both upper-class unionists and very low class loyalists. The
DUP is able to sell their platform to two groups whose interests should diverge in terms of taxes
and government funded support programs. Purvis also explained that the DUP often tries to be
economically conservative and socially liberal, which she does not think makes sense since
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interventionist economic policies are needed to support social programs.41 The fact that Ian
Paisley and Peter Robinson, two people with radically different agendas, are major players in the
same party is evidence of the shifting and undefined position of the DUP. The Alliance Party’s
platform is also vague. The most clear concrete component about their political agenda,
according to Brown, is that they are not nationalist or unionist.42
Douglas was quick to admit that “the DUP was becoming a broad church” that is content
with both rightwing conservatives and leftwing liberals.43 He went on to describe the UUP as a
party of independents because they disagree with each other in committees and are not always
unified during committee votes. When I asked Douglas and his intern, Phill Brett, the difference
between the DUP and the UUP, there was a short pause. Bret explained the two groups had a
different way of selling the same message and Douglas referred to the UUP as a more middle
class party looking to score political points. They did not mention any differences related to the
two parties’ positions on actual issues.44 It seems like the DUP and UUP have a loose and
shifting political agenda that can be tailored to attract different groups. In fact, I predict that the
DUP platform was described in a different light when Peter Robinson recruited Sammy Douglas
to run for election as a member of the DUP.
When I met with Sammy Douglas from the DUP, I became very confused as to what kind
of party the DUP was. My readings on Northern Ireland politics had described the DUP as a very
conservative party, but Douglas immediately told me he was a member of the Old Labor Party in
Britain that is notorious for its very liberal agenda. He went on to explain how he wanted welfare
programs for the communist most difficult to reach and policies to help with employment rates.
41
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This agenda was not consistent with the DUP’s stated conservative economy platform. He went
on to accuse the UUP of being too conservative when they are normally thought to be a more
centrist party. 45 During my interview with Purvis, I asked her about Sammy Douglas’ and the
DUP’s political ideology. Purvis smiled slightly and said that Sammy is confused. She told me
she tried to explain to him that he could not hold on to his socialist roots now that he is a member
of such a conservative right wing party. While I found the DUP’s political agenda to be riddled
with contradictions and overly broad, Sinn Fein was also worrisome.
Sinn Fein’s platform is equally undefined outside of its aspirations for a united Ireland.
Flemming explained that it was very difficult to balance the interests of hardliner supporters and
more moderate members without sending two different messages. Brown stated that Sinn Fein
voted for one of the most conservative budgets of all time. He believes Sinn Fein’s stated
economic philosophy is not apparent in their actual decisions.46 Purvis told me Deputy Minister,
Martin McGinnis, once said there was no a cigarette paper between him and DUP First Minister,
Peter Robinson, on economic issues.47 Sinn Fein becoming more conservative in their economic
policies is just a party becoming more moderate, but Sinn Fein continuing to grandstand on a
socialist economic agenda to sections of their constituents and then voting for a conservative
budget is more troubling.
Voters, on balance, are not making their decisions based on policy issues, so parties can
get away with a loose undefined platform. Voters giving parties the freedom to have undefined
and inconsistent political agendas poses a serious threat to democracy. If voters feel required to
cast votes to protect their ethnic party, regardless of the substantive issues, they are in a sense
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disenfranchised. If consociationalism wants to live up to its democratic ideals, it needs to
encourage voting based on substantive issues.

A Potential Solution: The De Borda Electoral System
Director of the De Borda Institute, Peter Emerson, studies different types of electoral
systems in post-conflict states. He grew up with one British parent and one Irish parent.
Frustrated with the categorization of people and divisions within society, he began to study
conflict resolution in many areas including the Balkans. He takes a strong stance against
majoritarianism and referendums because he believes they over limit the people’s choices. While
he thinks the De Haunt method paired with the consociational system is preferable to a purely
majoritarian system, he believes the political climate would improve if Northern Ireland adopted
the De Borda electoral system.48 There should be opportunities for smaller factions within ethnic
divides to grow, as well as cross-community parties. There needs to be space for parties to gain
votes because of their stance on labor rights or economic freedom, not just the strength of their
ethnic allegiance.49
The De Borda system has voters rank the options or candidates from first preference
onwards. Voters can choose to rank only one candidate, but their votes will be worth more, the
more candidates they rank. This voting system was illustrated in 1986, eight years before the
ceasefire, when Emerson held a meeting with representatives from every major political party
except the DUP. The 200 person meeting began with a moment of silence; it was a major
moment to have all the different political groups in one room. Next, there was a large discussion

48
49

Peter Emerson, Personal interview (14 Nov. 2011).
Tom Hadden, “Fixing the structure for shared government” (Fortnight Magazine Mar. 2010)

5.

Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2013

23

The Macalester Review, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3

in which anyone could suggest a solution to the constitutional question that was tearing apart
Northern Ireland. The only caveat was that the suggestion could not violate the UN Declaration
of Human Rights, which meant a party could not offer the solution of killing all the Protestants
or Catholics. At the end of the discussion, there were ten options on the ballot. Through the
discussion, people had brainstormed eight options beyond being part of Britain or being part of
the Republic. Each individual in the room was then asked to rank the options one through ten.
They could choose to rank only one option, but then their vote would only give that option one
point. On the other hand, if they ranked all ten, their first choice would get ten points, second
choice nine points etc. The system created an incentive for people to consider other ideas and
express their opinions on them.50
If Northern Ireland used this system, it would increase cross-community dialogue and
expand that factors that influence voter choice. In Emerson’s experiment, it is in the interest of
each group to persuade others to rank their option 5th instead of 8th because that could actually
affect the election. In the case of Northern Ireland politics this means parties cannot rely on an
easy win because of their hardliner base. Even if Sinn Fein gets all the hardliner votes, the SDLP
could still gain seats if both nationalists and unionists ranked it a high second. Moreover, it
provides an opportunity for smaller parties to gain influence because people can give them votes
without abandoning their first preference. Most importantly, voters would have to consider who
to give their second or third preferences to if they wanted their vote to be weighted for their first
preference. This would force them to break through the mentality that politics is a zero-sum
game and encourage them to think about more diverse reasons to vote for a candidate or party. If
voters are looking at real policy issues, then parties will be forced to create a stable platform to
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retain votes, thus reinforcing democratic values within the consociational system.
Consociationalism could continue to be a moderating influence on policymakinf and political
platforms, but voter choice would become more substantive preventing parties from
grandstanding on overly broad and shifting political agendas.
There are other suggestions that have been made as well. Including abolishing the
distinction between First and Deputy First Minister so that voters, especially unionists, are not
controlled by the fear that they will lose their position as First Minister and therefore never vote
outside of the DUP. This seems like an easy change to make to the system since the two
positions hold the exact same powers. Other ideas include increasing the role of non-aligned
‘other’ parties by allowing their votes to count for cross-community support when there’s a
petition of concern. Some people have talked about restructuring the government so there can be
an opposition, increasing the options for voters. At minimum, the government should
commission an independent review of the electoral system and be discussing ways it could be
improved.51

Conclusion
I set out to analyze whether consociationalism, both in terms of the electoral system and
government structure, had a moderating influence on Northern Ireland politics. I planned to see if
Horowitz’s theory of a centrifugal force accurately describes Northern Ireland politics or if
McGarry and O’Leary’s theory prevailed and consociationalism created a centripetal force,
pushing parties towards the moderate middle ground. Through interviews and topic literature, I
concluded consociationalism does have a moderating influence on policies and platforms. Both
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on sectarian issues and on the liberal – conservative divide, political parties are enacting more
moderate policies and adopting increasingly moderate political agendas. With the exception of
the occasional posturing for hardliners, there is no opportunity for extreme, antagonist or
conflict-related politics within Stormont.
However, Horowitz’s theory does continue to explain voter choice. Voters still want to
vote for the party they perceive to be more extreme, even if the party is increasingly moderate in
actuality. Voters are still swayed by the purely perceptual posturing of politicians and believe
they must vote for the most antagonistic of the parties because a compromising party would be
taken advantage of giving too much power to the other side. Because voters constantly give their
support to the seemingly hardliner parties, Sinn Fein and the DUP, these parties are not held
accountable to a consistent political agenda outside of “being nationalist” or “being unionist”. As
a result, parties have vague and undefined platforms that shift depending on whose votes they are
trying to attract at the time. A potential solution to this threat to democratic values is the De
Borda Electoral system, a form of consensus voting that encourages voters to consider issues
unrelated to ethnic allegiances.
My argument was formed through the stories and idea of the people I spoke with. If I had
the time to speak with 30 or more even if I had just spoke with eight different people, my
conclusions could easily be different. My research is not a conclusive claim about
consociationalism in Northern Ireland or the academic theories surrounding it. Rather, my
argument is an attempt to consolidate the opinions and information I was told into a cohesive
report of consociationalism’s impact on Northern Ireland politics. Future researcher should test
the opinions and hypothesis I heard from my interviewees through rigorous empirical research.

http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macreview/vol3/iss1/3

26

Noble: A Field Study of Consociationalism in the Northern Ireland Assembly

The could also focus on whether the moderating influence of consociationalism is different on
conflict related issues compared to general bread and butter issues.
Through this project I gained an overwhelming admiration and respect for the people I
spoke with and the efforts of the many individuals in Northern Ireland that have brought the state
this far along in only a few years. In the midst of studying electoral trends and analyzing ivory
tower academic theories, it is easy to forget about the darkness these political complexities
emerge from. As academics analyze the behavior of voters and politicians in post-conflict states,
it is important to remember many of these individuals went through unimaginable traumas. Many
of the people I spoke with experienced, in one way or another, the violent conflict that plagued
Northern Ireland for 30 years. When you put Northern Ireland’s political climate in perspective,
both sides of the conflict have come so far. Politicians, despite all emotional stress, sit down with
the other side. Voters express their perspectives through a ballot box instead of violence.
Consociationalism has brought stabilization and done its best to give people a voice. While there
is room for improvement, the people of Northern Ireland have moved the country in a better,
more peaceful direction.
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Appendix A.
Glossary of Terms
Consociationalism: A form of government often used in post-conflict states. It is pragmatically
driven by elite-level bargaining in the form of executive power-sharing in which the autonomy of
contending groups is constitutionally guaranteed and protected through mutual veto rights, and
where there is a strong respect for the principles of proportionality in elections, civil service
appointments and government subsidies.52
Centrifugal Force: The increasing divisions within politics as parties move farther from center
moderate ground and adopt more extremist, radical or even antagonistic agendas.
Centripetal Force: A unified force that brings people together towards the middle ground. It
describes the trend of political parties becoming moderate and moving inward.
Ethnic Outbidding: Outbidding occurs when parties compete for a position toward the end point
of a spectrum. In the case of ethnic outbidding, that spectrum measures a party’s ethnic
allegiance. Thus, ethnic outbidding is when parties compete to be most aligned with and most
dedicated to working for the interests of a particular ethnic group.
Intra-Ethnic Competition: Political competition within respective ethnic communities. In the case
of Northern Ireland, two nationalist parties like Sinn Fein and the SDLP in competition for votes
would be an example of intra-ethnic competition.
Posturing: To adopt an attitude or position for politically strategic purposes.
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